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a b s t r a c t
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Pittsburgh Research Laboratory, conducted
a study of past mine explosions to identify the ignition locations and ignition sources responsible for the
most severe explosion events resulting in death. Since the Scotia disaster of 1976, many fatalities from
underground coal mine explosions have been linked to nonpermissible electrical equipment ignition
sources located in intake air courses. With few exceptions, explosion protected equipment is generally
not required in intake air courses of gassy underground coal mines in the US. Cigarette lighters were
another prevalent ignition source for fatal explosions ignited in intake air courses. Several mine rescue/
recovery teams have encountered electrical ignition hazards. The study provides evidence that intake air
courses of gassy underground coal mines fit the description of certain Hazardous (classified) locations
described in the US National Electrical Code. Class I Division 2 or Zone 2 explosion protection tech-
niques may be used to design intake air equipment so that it does not present an ignition source under
normal operation, before mine power is shut down in emergency situations. Nonpermissible circuits in
intake air courses that are likely to remain energized during emergencies, e.g. battery powered equip-
ment, should be protected by more stringent Class I Division 1, Zone 1, or Zone 0 techniques, to protect
rescue/recovery personnel.
1. Introduction
Several prominent US underground coal mine explosion disas-
ters have been linked to electrical ignition sources located in intake
air courses. Thirteenminers were killed during the 2001 JimWalter
Resources No. 5 mine, Brookwood, AL, double explosion disaster
(MSHA, 2002; UMWA, 2003). The Mine Safety and Health Admin-
istration (MSHA) investigation concluded that both Brookwood
explosions were probably ignited in intake air entries, and both
were probably ignited by electrical equipment. Twenty-six miners
were killed during the 1976 Scotia KY double explosion disaster
(Bethell, 1976; Richmond, Price, Sapko, & Kawenski, 1983; USMRA,
2007). The US Mine Rescue Association (USMRA) attributes the
ignition source for the first explosion (15 killed), to a normally
sparking battery powered locomotive in an intake air entry. The
large loss of life from the Scotia and Brookwood disasters suggested
that, even though releases of flammable gas into intake air courses
may be infrequent, ignition of these releases by nonpermissible
electrical equipment can lead to large numbers of fatalities.
Title 30 of the US Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) contains
federal coal mining safety regulations (30 CFR). The term permis-
sible refers to equipment that meets MSHA specifications for the
construction and maintenance of such equipment, to assure that
such equipment will not cause a mine explosion or mine fire (30
CFR 75.2). Electrical equipment that is normally exposed to
methane or coal dust inby (closer to the working face than) the last
open crosscut (30 CFR 75.500), or within 150 feet of pillar workings
or longwall faces (30 CFR 75.1002), or in return entries (30 CFR
75.507), must be permissible. Any atmospheric monitoring system
operated during fan stoppages shall be intrinsically safe (30 CFR
75.313). Air quality detectors and measurement devices shall be
approved and maintained in permissible and proper operating
condition (30 CFR 75.320). Telephones and signaling devices shall
offer no probable explosion hazard under normal operation if used
in gassy or dusty mine atmospheres (30 CFR 23.6). Electrical
components of automatic fire sensors must be provided with
protection against ignition of methane or coal dust (30 CFR
75.1103-7). With these few exceptions, explosion protected elec-
trical equipment is generally not required in intake air courses of
gassy underground coal mines in the US.
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health,
Pittsburgh Research Laboratory, conducted a study of past mine
explosions to identify the ignition locations and ignition sources
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responsible for the most severe explosion events resulting in death.
(The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the author
and do not necessarily represent the views of the National Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health.) Fatalities linked to non-
permissible equipment ignition sources in intake air courses were
compiled and compared to other ignition sources and ignition
locations, to put the hazard posed by nonpermissible equipment in
intake air courses into perspective. Recommendations are provided
for preventing similar disasters in the future.
2. Historical summaries of coal mine explosions
US Bureau of Mines historical summaries of coal mine explo-
sions provide many examples of explosions that were ignited by
electrical equipment such as trolley wires and motor control con-
tactors (Dobroski, Stephan, & Conti, 1996; Humphrey, 1960; Rich-
mond et al., 1983). These summaries used the term disaster to
describe events producing at least 5 fatalities. In the most recent
summary, Dobroski et al. (1996) provided overviews and causal
analyses of coal mine explosions from 1981 to 1994. Causal analyses
involved only violations of MSHA regulations, which did not
include normally sparking equipment in intake air entries. For
example, theMcCluremine explosion in 1983 (7 killed), was ignited
by electrical arcing in possibly 6 pieces of equipment in intake air
courses, but the causal analysis involved only ventilation practices.
The causal analysis was similar to the Brookwood investigation in
this respect, which also made no mention of the electrical equip-
ment design in the causal analysis (MSHA, 2002). Some explosions
in Dobroski et al.’s (1996) summary tables were categorized as
electrical, but a distinction was not made as far as the location of
the equipment, or if the equipment was faulted permissible
equipment or normally sparking electrical equipment. In the
current study, fatalities linked to nonpermissible equipment igni-
tion sources in intake air courses were compiled and compared to
other ignition sources and ignition locations, to put the hazard
posed by nonpermissible equipment in intake air courses into
perspective.
Dobroski et al.’s (1996) summary tables did not account for
uncertainties associated with multiple possible ignition sources or
ignition locations. For example, the summary tables attributed the
Pyro William Station Mine disaster of 1989 to a cutting torch even
though the gas valves on the torch were found closed. The narrative
description of the explosion pointed out that other types of ignition
sources were considered possible in no particular order of likeli-
hood. The possible ignition sources were at the face or in an intake
air course. In the current study, explosion fatality summaries were
weighted for cases where a most likely ignition source or location
was not identified, to better account for multiple potential ignition
sources and locations for comparison purposes.
3. Surveillance study methods
Fatal accidents categorized as ignition or explosion since 1976
were identified through the Mining Accident, Injury and Illness
(MAII) database (NIOSH, 2007). MSHA investigation reports for
fatal accidents since 1995 were downloaded from the MSHA web
site (MSHA, 2007). Fatal accident reports prior to 1995 were
obtained from the MSHA Technical Information Center and Library,
Beckley WV. Richmond et al.’s (1983) and USMRA (2007) accounts
of the Scotia disaster were used because an MSHA investigation
report was never released. The review did not include MSHA fatal
reports categorized as fire. The review did not include fatal reports
categorized as explosives that did not also involve ignition of gas or
dust. Highwall mines, which are categorized as surfacemines, were
included in the study because they involved explosions of methane
and coal dust ignited in openings mined under the surface.
Ignition locations were categorized as follows.
 Unsealed Gob refers to the space left by the extraction of a coal
seam into which waste is packed or the immediate roof caves
and the area had not yet been sealed from the active workings.
 Sealed area refers to a worked-out area (30 CFR 75.301) that is
sealed. Sealed areas were not required to be maintained as an
inert atmosphere prior to 2007.
 Return air is defined as air that has ventilated the last working
place on any split of any working section or any worked-out
area, whether pillared or nonpillared (30 CFR 75.301).
 Intake air is defined as air that has not yet ventilated the last
working place on any split of any working section, or any
worked-out area, whether pillared or nonpillared (30 CFR
75.301.) Intake air is taken to include belt air course, as 30 CFR
does not make a distinction between intake and belt air course
for electrical equipment permissibility purposes in methane
contaminated atmospheres.
 Shaft refers to a vertical or near vertical excavation in rock for
the purpose of providing access to an ore body.
 A high wall opening refers to an underground excavation into
the wall of an open-cut excavation.
 A working face is defined as any place in a coal mine in which
work of extracting coal from its natural deposit in the earth is
performed during the mining cycle (30 CFR 75.2). Face refers to
areas inby the last open crosscut up to the working face or
within 150 feet of pillar workings or longwall faces.
Electrical equipment ignition sources were subdivided into two
categories.
 Faulted permissible equipment refers to permissible equipment
that malfunctioned in a manner that defeated the explosion
protection feature of the equipment.
 Nonpermissible equipment refers to electrical equipment not
identified as permissible and not required to be explosion
protected. Vehicle refers to locomotives or personnel carriers.
Vehicle ignition source categories were subdivided as battery
powered and trolley wire powered.
For cases where a single most likely ignition source or location
was not identified, the number of fatalities attributed to categories
of ignition sources or locations were weighted by the uncertainty
associated with each. For example, if an explosion resulted in 10
fatalities, and two possible ignition locations with five possible
ignition sources were identified in no particular order of likelihood,
each ignition location was attributed 5 fatalities, and each ignition
source was attributed 2 fatalities.
4. Results
Appendix Table A1 lists fatal methane and/or coal dust explo-
sions in underground and high wall coal mines since 1976. All
intake air entry explosions occurred when the ventilation system
failed or was determined to be inadequate. All fatal intake air entry
explosions involved only methane initially. The severities of some
of these explosions were enhanced by coal dust suspensions after
the methane was ignited.
The 1989 Pyro No. 9 explosion disaster originated in one of two
different locations and could have been ignited by 5 different types
of ignition sources. An intake air entry was identified as the tran-
sition zone where a strong explosion developed, but a weaker
explosion originating on a longwall face that propagated to the
transition zone was also plausible. A cutting torch and igniter were
found at the face, although both gas valves on the torch were found
closed. A permissible scoop with multiple faults was found at the
face. An undetonated blasting cap was found near the transition
zone, suggesting blasting caps conceivably could have been
involved. A roof fall with pyritic inclusions occurring in the tran-
sition zone was a conceivable ignition source. A messenger wire
strung through the transition zone that could have snapped under
tension was a conceivable ignition source. The most likely ignition
location or source could not be determined.
The 1983 McClure and 1987 Double R explosions involved
multiple possible electrical ignition sources in no particular order of
likelihood. All six electrical ignition sources identified for the seven
McClure explosion fatalities involved equipment not identified as
permissible. Three of the four possible electrical ignition sources
identified for the Double R explosion fatality involved equipment
not identified as permissible.
One of the Brookwood miners may have received fatal injuries
from the first explosion prior to the second massive explosion. This
fatality was attributed to the first 2001 Brookwood explosion in
Table A1. The battery assembly cited as the ignition source of the
first explosion had been removed from a permissible scoop andwas
located at a nonpermissible charging station.
The fatality for the 1987 Dutch Creek No. 2 ignition suffered
a myocardial infarction while fighting a fire resulting from the
ignition. The miner later died from a cardiac arrhythmia. A fatality
review committee decided the accident was chargeable to the
mining industry because the conditions surrounding the miner’s
fire fighting activities contributed to his death. The MSHA investi-
gation report classified this accident as a fatal methane–air ignition.
Using Table A1 data, Figs. 1–5 show fatalities linked to different
locations and ignition sources. In Fig. 1, the numbers of fatalities per
location were weighted by the uncertainty of the location of the
1989 Pyro No. 9 disaster. Of the ten 1989 Pyro fatalities, 5 were
attributed to a face ignition and 5 were attributed to an intake air
entry ignition. 71 of 160 fatalities were linked to intake air courses
using this weighting method (Fig. 1). Considering all fatalities from
the 1989 Pyro disaster, 76 fatalities were linked to intake air cour-
ses. In Fig. 2, numbers of fatalities per category were weighted by
ignition source uncertainties of the 1989 Pyro No. 9 disaster and
1987 Double R explosion. In Fig. 3, numbers of fatalities per cate-
gory were weighted by ignition source uncertainties of the 1989
Pyro No. 9 disaster and 1987 Double R explosion. In Fig. 4, numbers
of fatalities per category were weighted by ignition source uncer-
tainties of the 1983 McClure disaster and the 1987 Double R
explosion.
5. Discussion
5.1. Class I hazardous locations
Certain techniques are used to design electrical equipment to
protect against igniting explosions in locations where flammable
materials may be encountered under normal or abnormal condi-
tions. These locations are classified as Hazardous locations
described in the National Electrical Code (NEC)1. NEC Article
500 describes Division locations, while AT:/PGN/ELSEVIER/JLPP/
22(1)/web/00002010/rticle 505 describes Zone locations (NEC,
2005). The requirements for Divisions and Zones differ somewhat
because the Division system was developed in the US while the
Zone system was developed in Europe. Zones were recognized in
the NEC beginning in 1996. NFPA 497 and NFPA 499 provide
guidelines for classifying Hazardous Locations.
One description of Class I Division 2 or Zone 2 is a locationwhere
ignitable concentrations of gases or vapors are normally prevented
by positive mechanical ventilation, and which might become
hazardous through failure or abnormal operation of the ventilating
equipment (NEC 500.5(B)(2); 505.5(B)(3)). Division 2 and Zone 2
were established to allow the use of less expensive equipment and
less restrictive wiring methods as a more practical approach to
preventing explosions in locations that become flammable only
under infrequent, abnormal situations (Babiarz, 2004). Babiarz,
Delans, and Hughes (1997) conducted a survey that found Division
2 classified locations were by far the most common Hazardous
(classified) locations in North American industries at risk from
ignition of flammable materials, outside of the underground coal
mining industry. A rule of thumb for Division 2 or Zone 2 equip-
ment is that it should not be an ignition source under normal
operation. Redundant safety features are generally not required.
The safety justification for the equipment is that the explosion
protection features are not likely to fail simultaneously with theIntake, 71
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Fig. 1. 160 methane and/or coal dust explosion fatalities by location of the ignition
source in underground or high wall coal mines from 1976 to 2006. Numbers of
fatalities per location were weighted by the location uncertainty of the 1989 Pyro No. 9
disaster.
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Fig. 2. Ignition sources linked to 160 methane and/or coal dust explosion fatalities in
underground and high wall coal mines from 1976 to 2006. Numbers of fatalities per
category were weighted by ignition source uncertainties of the 1989 Pyro No. 9
disaster and 1987 Double R explosion.
1 National Electrical Code and NEC are registered trademarks of the National
Fire Protection Association, Quincy MA.
infrequent process failure that releases the flammablematerial. The
less redundant or robust features of Division 2 or Zone 2 equipment
reflect the layer of protection already provided by the flammable
material containment or ventilation system to prevent the flam-
mable atmosphere from contacting the electrical equipment.
Requirements for Division 2 or Zone 2 approved equipment imply
that when lives are at stake, a good ventilation system should not
be used in place of the protected equipment; rather, the protected
equipment is a necessary layer of protection along with the venti-
lation system.
One condition for Class I Zone 2 locations is that if a flammable
atmosphere is released, it will exist only for a short period (NEC
505.5(B)(3)). During mine emergencies, however, battery powered
equipment may be abandoned and exposed to methane for an
extended period of time. More stringent Class I Division 1, Zone 1 or
Zone 0 protection would therefore be necessary for battery pow-
ered equipment abandoned during a mine emergency. One
description of a Class I Division 1 or Zone 1 location is a location in
which ignitable concentrations of flammable gases or vapors can or
are likely to exist under normal operating conditions (NEC
500.5(B)(1); 505.5(B)(2)). Class I Division 1 overlaps with Zone 0,
which is a location where flammable gases or vapors are present
continuously or for a long periods of time (NEC 505(B)(1)).
The Hazardous Class refers to the flammable material; Class I
materials are flammable gases and vapors (NEC 500.5 (B)). Methane
is a Class I Group D (Division system) or Class I Group IIA (Zone
system) flammable material. Class I Group I (Zone system) refers to
firedamp, defined as a mixture of gases, composed mostly of
methane, found underground, usually in mines. NFPA 497 provides
guidelines for classifying flammable liquids, gases, or vapors.
5.2. Risk assessment for explosion protected equipment
A risk assessment approach for the acceptance of explosion
protected equipment has been introduced by the International
Electrotechnical Commission, Technical Committee 31 (IEC TC 31),
as an alternative method to the current prescriptive practice linking
equipment to Zones (IEC 60079-0). To facilitate this, a system of
equipment protection levels (EPLs) has been introduced to indicate
the inherent ignition risk of the equipment, no matter what type of
protection is used. For coal mining, EPL Ma refers to equipment
having a ‘‘very high’’ level of protection, which has sufficient
security that it is unlikely to become an ignition source, even when
left energized in the presence of an outbreak of gas. Typically,
communication circuits and gas detection equipment would be
constructed to meet the Ma requirements. EPL Mb refers to
equipment having a ‘‘high’’ level of protection, which has sufficient
security that it is unlikely to become an ignition source in the time
span between there being an outbreak of gas and the equipment
being de-energized. Typically all coal mining equipment would be
constructed to meet the Mb requirements, for example flameproof
motors and switchgear. EN 1127-2 describes basic explosion
prevention concepts for mining equipment used in Europe. EN 1710
notes that high energy mining equipment batteries cannot be de-
energized when an explosive atmosphere occurs, and are ignition-
protected according to EN 60079-7 as type ‘‘e’’ – ‘increased safety
apparatus’. Groh (2004) explains ‘‘increased safety’’ among other
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Fig. 5. Most likely ignition sources identified by MSHA for 36 fatalities from methane
and methane plus coal dust explosions in underground coal mines from 2000 to 2006.
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Fig. 3. Methane and methane plus coal dust explosion fatalities linked to ignition
sources in intake air courses of underground coal mines from 1976 to 2006. Numbers
of fatalities per category were weighted by ignition source uncertainties of the 1989
Pyro No. 9 disaster and the 1987 Double R explosion.
Vehicle, battery
powered, 20.2 
Cable fault,
14.55
 
Vehicle, trolley 
wire, 5
Cable
connector, 2.3 
Power center,
1.7
Battery , 1
Fig. 4. Methane and methane plus coal dust explosion fatalities linked to non-
permissible electrical equipment in intake air courses from 1976 to 2006. Numbers of
fatalities per category were weighted by ignition source uncertainties of the 1983
McClure disaster and the 1987 Double R explosion.
explosion protection techniques for underground coal mining
equipment commonly used outside of the US.
5.3. Intake air course hazards
Fig. 1 shows that many US explosion fatalities since 1976 can be
linked to ignition sources in intake air courses. In all of these
accidents, the ventilation system failed or was found to be inade-
quate. These fatalities suggest intake air courses of gassy under-
ground coal mines should be considered Class I Division 2 or Zone 2
locations at a minimum, i.e. locations in which flammable gases or
vapors are normally prevented by positive mechanical ventilation,
and which might become hazardous through failure or abnormal
operation of the ventilating equipment (NEC 500.5 (b) (2); 505.5
(b) (3)).
All intake air ignitions involvedmethane initially. The severity of
some of these explosions was enhanced by coal dust suspensions
after the methane was ignited. Equipment designed for methane
atmospheres would reduce the risk of fatal explosions compared to
the risk of using normally sparking equipment in intake air courses
of gassy underground coal mines. This does not preclude the need
to protect against hazards from coal dust layers that may accu-
mulate on equipment or in entries, posing a fire hazard or explosion
enhancement hazard after the dust is entrained in the air. 30 CFR 75
subpart E addresses combustiblematerials and rock dusting. 30 CFR
75 subpart L addresses fire hazards. Direct ignition of coal dust
suspensions is a primary concernwhen using explosives. 30 CFR 75
subpart N addresses explosives and blasting.
Figs. 2 and 3 show that nonpermissible equipment can be linked
tomore explosion fatalities than any other ignition source category,
for all locations, and especially in intake air courses. Fig. 5 shows
this trend continues to recent times. All of the nonpermissible
equipment ignition sources linked to explosion fatalities were
located in intakes. Fig. 4 shows that nonpermissible vehicles
(battery and trolley powered) were linked to most intake explosion
fatalities. Today, several underground vehicle manufacturers offer
explosion protected locomotives and personnel carriers, track or
tire, battery or diesel. Given the history of vehicle ignited fatal
explosions and the availability of explosion protected vehicles, use
of explosion protected vehicles in intake air courses of gassy
underground coal mines is recommended to reduce this hazard.
Twelve of the cable fault fatalities (Fig. 4) can be linked to the
damaged block light cable igniting the second massive Brookwood
explosion. The block light system was not required to be designed
to prevent methane ignition as it was installed in an intake air
entry. The description of the block light circuit (MSHA, 2002)
suggests the block light installation may not have met several
requirements for flexible cords in Class I Hazardous Locations
(2005 NEC 501.140; 505.17)2. Potential violations involved: lack
of a separate grounding conductor, cord not listed for extra hard
usage, cord not protected from damage by location or suitable
guard. Compliance with these NEC and OSHA requirements
might have prevented the 2nd 2001 Brookwood explosion
(Dubaniewicz, 2007).
30 CFR 75.323 directs workers to disconnect electrical circuits
at the power source when excess methane is present. Dis-
connecting circuits can produce an incendiary spark. Yet, explo-
sion protected disconnects are not required in intake air entries
that may become flammable during emergencies, when the
ventilation system fails. Activation of nonpermissible circuit
breakers in power centers were implicated in the 1987 Double R
and 1983 McClure fatal explosions. The most likely ignition
source for the first 1976 Scotia explosion was arcing created by
the open type electric motor controller on the locomotive when
the controller was turned to the ‘‘off’’ position. Thirty years later,
a miner disconnected battery leads to a nonpermissible vehicle
during the early stages of the 2006 Sago disaster. This action was
prompted by a carbon monoxide alarm alerting the miner to bad
air. Even if a methane monitor alarm had sounded in this situa-
tion, a literal interpretation of 30 CFR 75.323 would have directed
this miner to disconnect the circuit in the presence of excess
methane. Shutting off a light switch in a faulted explosion proof
enclosure while evacuating during a methane outburst was the
likely ignition source for the 1981 Dutch Creek disaster, 15 killed.
Although the enclosure was faulted, this disaster is a horrific
example of the dangers of disconnecting unprotected circuits in
a flammable atmosphere. Inspection, maintenance, and repair of
explosion protected equipment are of paramount importance.
Explosion protection is recommended for all electrical discon-
nects in intake air courses that may activate automatically or be
activated manually in the presence of excess methane during
emergencies.
Most fatalities linked to cigarette lighters occurred when the
miner was lighting up in intake air courses (Fig. 3). Smoking
materials are prohibited in underground coal mines (30 CFR
75.1702). The smoking related fatal explosions emphasize the
hazard of open ignition sources located in intake air courses of
gassy mines should the ventilation system fail or become inade-
quate. The use of explosion protected electrical equipment in
intakes of gassy mines may make the miner more aware of ignition
hazards in these areas, including smoking materials.
5.4. Rescue team hazards
Rescue/recovery teams have encountered electrical ignition
sources, some with fatal consequences. An energized block light
circuit was the likely ignition source for the second 2001 Brook-
wood explosion, killing all of the rescuers. While recovering the
deceased miner from the 1987 Double R explosion, the recovery
team encountered an arcing cable connected to a battery. Following
the 2001 Brookwood disaster, the United Mine Workers of America
recommended rubber conduit be placed over battery charging
cables. This recommendation would have also applied 15 years
earlier to the 1987 Double R explosion. 1989 Pyro recovery
personnel encountered a faulted permissible battery powered
scoop tractor with a pump motor running. 2006 Sago rescuers
encountered a battery powered mantrip with lights on. Class I
Division 2 or Zone 2 techniques are not appropriate for circuits that
may be immersed in a flammable atmosphere for a long time
during a mine emergency. More stringent Class I Division 1, Zone 1,
or Zone 0 techniques are recommended for nonpermissible battery
powered equipment in intake air courses, to protect rescue and
recovery personnel.
6. Recommendations
Since 1976, many fatalities from explosions in gassy under-
ground coal mines can be linked to ignitions in intake air entries,
when the ventilation system failed or was inadequate. The fatal
explosions ignited in intake air courses of gassy underground coal
mines involved onlymethane initially. The severity of some of these
explosions was enhanced by coal dust suspensions only after the
methane was ignited. The fatality data suggests intake air entries
that may become flammable should the ventilation system fail
should be considered Hazardous (classified) Locations per the
NEC, Class I Division 2 or Zone 2 at a minimum.
2 The 1999 NEC was in effect at the time of the Brookwood disaster. Require-
ments for flexible cords in Class I hazardous locations are found under Article
501-11 of the 1999 NEC.
Many fatalities from explosions ignited in intake air entries can
be linked to electrical equipment. Class I Division 2 or Zone 2
explosion protection techniques are recommended for non-
permissible equipment used in intake air courses so that it does not
present an ignition source under normal operation, before the
power source is removed in the event of an emergency. Non-
permissible equipment that is likely to remain energized during
emergencies, e.g. battery powered equipment, should be protected
bymore stringent Class I Division 1, Zone 1, or Zone 0 techniques, to
protect rescue/recovery personnel. US mining industry participa-
tion with the IEC to develop a risk assessment approach for the
acceptance of explosion protected mining equipment is
recommended.
Of the nonpermissible equipment ignition sources, vehicles
were linked to most intake explosion fatalities. Use of explosion
protected vehicles in intake air courses of gassy underground coal
mines is recommended to reduce this hazard. Compliancewith NEC
requirements for flexible cords in Class I Hazardous Locations is
recommended to reduce the ignition hazard of cable faults in intake
air courses of gassy underground coal mines. Explosion protection
is recommended for all electrical disconnects in intake air courses
of gassy mines that may activate automatically or be activated
manually in the presence of methane during emergencies.
Inspection, maintenance, and repair of explosion protected equip-
ment are of paramount importance.
The smoking related fatalities emphasize the hazard of open
ignition sources located in intake air courses or other active
workings of gassy mines where miners are normally required to
work or travel.
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Appendix
Table A1
Fatal methane and/or coal dust explosions in underground and high wall coal mines
1976–2006
Year Operator, mine,
and state
Fuel Ignition
location
Ignition sources Killed
1976 Scotia Coal Co.,
Scotia Mine, KY
Methane Intake Normal arcing of
battery powered
locomotive
15
1976 Scotia Coal Co.,
Scotia Mine, KY
Methane &
coal dust
Face Roof fall onto
roof bolter
11
1977 P & P Coal Co., #2
mine, VA
Methane Return Cigarette lighter 4
1977 Bethlehem
Mines Corp.,
Revloc #32, PA
Methane Shaft Torch 1
1980 Westmoreland
Coal Co., Ferrell
#17 Mine, WV
Methane Intake Trolley wire
powered
locomotive
5
1981 Mid-Continent
Resources, Inc.,
Dutch Creek #1
Mine, CO
Methane &
coal dust
Face Faulted
explosion proof
enclosure on
continuous
miner (CM)
15
1981 Adkins Coal Co.,
#11 Mine, KY
Coal dust Face Detonation of
explosives
8
1981 Grundy Mining
Co., #21Mine, TN
Methane Intake Cigarette lighter 13
1982 RFH Coal Co., #1
Mine, KY
Coal dust Face Detonation of
explosives
7
Table A1 (continued)
Year Operator, mine,
and state
Fuel Ignition
location
Ignition sources Killed
1983 Clinchfield Coal
Co., McClure #1
Mine, VA
Methane Intake Battery powered
track mounted
mantrip, power
center circuit
breaker, dinner
hole light
connection, cable
plug for CM
trailing cable,
belt control cable
disconnect or
fault, ground
fault in trailing
cable for
conveyor belt
feeder.
7
1983 Helen Mining
Co., Homer City
Mine, PA
Methane Intake Arcing controller
on vehicle
1
1984 Pennsylvania
Mines Corp.,
Greenwich
Collieries #1
Mine, PA
Methane Intake Normal arcing of
nonpermissible
battery powered
locomotive
3
1985 M.S.W. Coal Co.,
#2 Slope, PA
Methane Face Detonation of
explosives
3
1986 Pyro Mining Co.,
Pyro #9 Slope,
William Station
Mine, KY
Methane
and/or coal
dust
Face Detonation of
explosives
1
1987 Mid-Continent
Resources Inc.,
Dutch Creek #2
Mine, CO
Methane Face CM bits struck
sandstone roof
1
1987 Double R Coal
Co., #1 Mine, VA
Methane &
coal dust
Intake Two power
centers, battery
charging cable,
faulted
permissible
scoop.
1
1989 Pyro Mining Co.,
Pyro #9 Slope,
William Station
Mine, KY
Methane Face or
intake
Faulted
permissible
scoop at face,
torch or igniter at
face, blasting cap
in intake, roof fall
in intake,
messenger wire
tensile failure in
intake
10
1991 Fire Creek Inc.,
#1 Mine, WV
Methane Face Cigarette lighter
or match
2
1991 Addwest Mining
Inc., Watson
Bridge Mine, KY
Methane &
coal dust
Highwall
opening
CM bits struck
hard roof
1
1992 Consolidation
Coal Co.,
Blacksville #1
Mine, WV
Methane Shaft Welding sparks 4
1992 Southmountain
Coal Co., #3
Mine, VA
Methane &
coal dust
Intake Cigarette lighter 8
1993 A.A.&W. Coal Co.,
Elmo #5 Mine,
KY
Methane &
coal dust
Return Cigarette lighter 1
1994 Day Branch Coal
Co., #9 Mine, KY
Methane &
coal dust
Return Cigarette lighter 2
2000 Plateau Mining
Corp., Willow
Creek Mine, UT
Methane Unsealed
gob
Roof collapse
ignited 1st
explosion,
subsequent oil
and coal fire
ignitedmore
explosions
2
(continued on next page)
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Table A1 (continued)
Year Operator, mine,
and state
Fuel Ignition
location
Ignition sources Killed
2001 Jim Walter
Resources Inc.,
#5 Mine,
Brookwood AL
Methane Intake Battery assembly
removed from
scoop and
damaged by roof
fall
1
2001 Jim Walter
Resources Inc.,
#5 Mine,
Brookwood AL
Methane &
coal dust
Intake Damaged block
light cable
12
2003 McElroy Coal Co.,
McElroy Mine,
WV
Methane Shaft Cutting torch 3
2006 International
Coal Group, Sago
Mine, WV
Methane Sealed
area
Lightning 12
2006 Kentucky Darby
LLC, Darby Mine
#1, KY
Methane &
coal dust
Return Torch 5
2006 R&D Coal Co., PA Methane Face Explosives 1
Total 160
